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THE RIGHT TO A JURY TRIAL
IN A STOCKHOLDER'S DERIVATIVE ACTION
A recent decision of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, DePinto v. Provi-
dent Security Life Ins. Co.,' decided for the first time that a constitutional
right to jury trial exists for a stockholder's derivative action. The decision vms
based upon the seventh amendment's expressly limited guaranty that "in suits
at common law.., the right of trial by jury shall be preserved... ."- Tradi-
tionally, the amendment's historical reference has been read as granting a
right to jury trial in civil actions identical or analogous to common law actions
existing in 1791. The Supreme Court, however, confronted with fundamental
changes in modern procedure, has recently suggested that a hypothetical test
ba applied to the amendments historical reference.3 The Court thus projected
the merger of law and equity into the historical conditions existing in 1791
and then applied the seventh amendment to this hypothetical context. Because
the extent of permissible projection has not been dearly defined by the Court,
certainty in the interpretation of the seventh amendment has been disrupted.
But regardless of which view of the seventh amendment is adopted, DePinto
appears to be a striking misapplication of either historical analysis.
The suit was instituted by a shareholder of United Security Life Insurance
Company against certain of United's officers and directors, who were charged
with fraud, negligence and breach of fiduciary duty in purchasing worthless
shares of another corporation.4 The plaintiff filed a timely demand for a jury
trial. He later attempted to withdraw this demand but the defendants refused
1. 323 F.2d 826 (9th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 950 (1964).
2. The seventh amendment reads:
In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars,
the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury, shall be
otherwise re-examined in any Court of the United States, than according to the
rules of the common law.
U.S. CoxsT. amend. VII.
The seventh amendment creates no new right to trial by jury. 5 MooRE FEDERAL PRActicE
38.08[6] at 90 (2d ed. 1951) [hereinafter cited as Moore].
3. See text accompanying notes 49-50 in!ra.
4. After an initial judgment in favor of United against all the defendants in the
United States District Court for the District of Arizona, the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that a merger of United into Provident Security Life
Insurance Company had deprived the complaining shareholder of standing to sue. Niesz
v. Gorsuch, 295 F.2d 909 (9th Cir. 1961). After a reconstitution and realignment of the
parties, including the intervention as a plaintiff of a present Provident shareholder who
had been a former United shareholder and the realignment of Provident as a defendant,
the district court readopted its original decision. The court of appeals affirmed the district
court's permission to the Provident shareholder to intervene as plaintiff and its holding
that the remanded proceeding was not barred by the Arizona statutes of limitations.
DePinto v. Provident Security Life Ins. Co., 323 F.2d 826, 830, 832 (9th Cir. 1963). The
third question presented on appeal was whether the defendants had been deprived of their
constitutional right to trial by jury. The Ninth Circuit's resolution of this question is the
subject of this Note.
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to consent to this withdrawal. The plaintiff then moved under Rule 39(a) (2) 0
for a trial to the court on the ground that neither constitutional nor statutory
right to trial by jury existed in a stockholder's derivative action." The de-
fendants resisted this motion. 7 The district court reserved decision on the
motion, and announced that a jury would hear the case, but that its verdict
would be considered advisory if the motion for trial to the court was ultimately
granted. After the close of evidence, the jury considered the case and returned
a general verdict against certain of the defendants in the sum of $20,000. The
district judge then granted the plaintiff's motion to strike trial by jury, ac-
cordingly treated the jury verdict as advisory, and entered judgment against
each defendant in the sum of $314,794.19.8 The basis of this ruling was that
a stockholder's derivative action was "basically if not solely" equitable rather
than legal in nature and, therefore, no right to trial by jury existed.0 The
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the ruling of the district court,
and remanded for a new trial.10
5. When trial by jury has been demanded as provided in Rule 38, the action shall be
designated upon the docket as a jury action. The trial of all issues so demanded
shall be by jury, unless ... (2) the court upon motion or of its own initiative finds
that a right of trial by jury of some or all of those issues does not exist tinder the
Constitution or statutes of the United States.
FED. R. Civ. P. 39 (a) (2).
6. No federal statute establishes a right of trial by jury in a derivative action. DePluto
v. Provident Security Life Ins. Co., 323 F.2d 826, 834 (9th Cir. 1963).
7. Although the defendants had not demanded trial by jury they were entitled to rely
on the plaintiff's demand. FED. R. Civ. P. 38(d); 5 MooRE 38.45, at 343-44.
8. The opinion of the district court is not reported. It may be found in Petition for a
Writ of Certiorari, pp. la-8a, Provident Security Life Insurance Co. v. DePinto, 376 U.S.
950 (1964).
The opinion contained three related rulings; each was apparently intended to provide
independent support for the result. First was a ruling that the jury verdicts were supported
by neither evidence nor legal principle and therefore "hereby are set aside and given no
effect." Id. at 2a. Second was the ruling that the jury verdicts should be treated as advisory
only, since the suit was equitable rather than legal. Third was the grant of the directed
verdict for the plaintiffs, the effect of which was to substitute for the jury's assessment of
damages a figure almost twenty times higher. The stated basis for this grant was that the
evidence established "beyond reasonable challenge" and with "no substantial evidence to
the contrary" a loss of assets to the corporation of a minimum of $314,794.19. Id. at 6a-7a.
9. The district court opinion stated:
Under federal rules and procedure, determination of the right to jury trial depends
upon whether the issues to be tried are cognizable in law or in equity . . . . From
their earliest recognition, stockholders' derivative actions have been regarded and
treated as sounding in equity and not as actions at law. [Citation omitted] The
present suit is solely and only a stockholders' derivative action. Therefore, as a
proceeding basically if not solely in equity, the case was not triable by jury as a
matter of right to any of the defendants now demanding same.
Id. at 3a.
10. DePinto v. Provident Security Life Ins. Co., 323 F.2d 826, 839 (9th Cir. 1963).
The court of appeals also reversed the trial court's alternative holding and judgment which
granted plaintiff's motion for a directed verdict, although this ruling by the district judge
had apparently been entered under the assumption that the defendants were entitled to a
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The mandate of the seventh amendment is founded, of course, upon the
division of the English and American legal systems into separate law and
equity jurisdictions, each with different procedures, remedies, and techniques
for fact-finding. With few exceptions, actions cognizable in the courts of
common law were triable to a jury, while in equity there was no right to jury
trial." Although the American federal system did not adopt the English or-
ganization of wholly separate court systems, the English distinctions con-
cerning the right to jury trial were preserved as a result of the distinct law
and equity procedures which were applied in the federal courts.13  Where
analysis of modem actions reveals a single historical counterpart, which is
readily identifiable as having been within the jurisdiction of common law or
of equity - such as a suit for damages for breach of contract or a bill to en-
join the continuance of a nuisance - the problem of jury trial has been the
relatively simple one of correct historical analysis.' 4 If the modem action fits
the pattern of an action at common law, there is a right to jury trial; if the
action, on the other hand, is characteristic of an equitable bill, no right to
jury trial is preserved. Most of the difficult jury trial problems in the merged
federal practice have resulted from the combination of legal and equitable
jury trial. This judgment had assessed liability against each of the defendants for $314,-
794.19, despite the jury's exoneration of two of the defendants and assessment of only
$20,000 liability against the remaining defendants. Drawing an analogy to the seventh
amendment's prohibition of additur in federal practice, Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474
(1935), the court of appeals held the seventh amendment similarly prohibited an award of
damages in excess of a jury verdict in a suit triable by right to a jury where a jury had
been in effect, demanded and had heard the case. DePinto v. Provident Security Life Ins.
Co., 323 F.2d 826, 837-38 (9th Cir. 1963). Only the trial court's action in setting aside the
verdict was thus left intact by the court of appeals, and the effect of the decision was to
grant a new trial.
11. 5 Mfock 38.02[1], at 8-9. The history of the development of the jury is traced
in 1 HorvswoRrn, A HISTORY OF ENGrsH LAW 312-50 (6th rev. ed. 1938).
12. 2 MOORE f 2.03.
13. 5 MooRa ff 38.02[2]. The guaranty of jury trial according to an historical test is
of questionable functional validity in a merged procedure. Historically, the division between
law and equity was not the result of an attempt to classify issues according to their suit-
ability for trial to a jury or court. Generally, the chancellor's acceptance of jurisdiction
was influenced by factors such as the availability of specific remedies, evidentiary flexi-
bility, or the possibility of avoiding multiple suits. In addition, the acceptance of certain
disputes by the courts of law or equity was often dictated by the political struggle beteen
King and Parliament. James, Right to a Jury Trial in Civil Actions, 72 YAM U. 655,
661-62 (1963). The seventh amendment has, nevertheless, elevated the historical distinc-
tion between law and equity to a constitutional command in determining the question of
mode of trial.
14. The analysis is often complicated by the lack of a rigid barrier between law and
equity and the continual process of borrowing, and consequent overlap, between jurisdic-
tions before the adoption of the constitutional provision. James, supra note 13, at 658-61.
But where the line between law and equity is generally, if not specifically, definable, the
characterization of an action as legal or equitable normally disposes of the question of
mode of trial.
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claims in a single action,15 and from the compulsory interposition of legal and
equitable counterclaims without regard to the legal or equitable nature of the
complaint.'6 In these cases the guaranty of the seventh amendment must be
separately applied to each element of the modern action which would have
been a separate suit at law or in equity, and then a determination must be made
as to sequence of trial.
The threshold question for the Ninth Circuit in DePinto was, therefore, the
historical determination of whether a stockholder's derivative action was a
unitary action at law or in equity or a combination of formerly separate legal
and equitable claims. The court devoted one paragraph to this issue.
A stockholder's derivative action is an invention of equity to supply the
want of an adequate remedy at law to redress breaches of fiduciary duty.
The aid of equity is needed in order to establish the shareholder's right
to sue in the corporate stead. But the claim set up is that of the corpora-
tion.'7
The opinion then asserted that "therefore" the question of jury trial in a
derivative action depends on whether, had the claim been directly brought by
the corporation rather than indirectly by the stockholder, the suit would have
been cognizable at common law.' 8 Having made this conceptual distinction
between the right of the shareholder and the right of the corporation, the court
shifted its inquiry from the nature of the action to the nature of the allegations
and of the remedy sought. The court read the complaint, which asked only for
money damages, as being founded on allegations of gross negligence. An action
brought by a corporation against its officers demanding money damages for
negligence would historically have been heard in a court of common law and
would have been triable by right to a jury.'9 The court thus held that because
the suit could have been brought by the corporation in a cause of action
triable at law, and for a remedy available at law, the constitutional guaranty
of jury trial was applicable.20 Although the Ninth Circuit's analysis lacks the
explicitness necessary to precise understanding, in focusing upon the nature
of the corporation's hypothetical cause of action the court appears to have
15. FED. R. Civ. P. 18(a).
16. FED. P, Civ. P. 13(a). Difficult problems of sequence of trial have led to attempted
solutions from the "basic nature of the issue" test adopted by Professor Moore, 5 Mloota
ff 38.16, to the Supreme Court's recent sweeping decision in Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. West-
over that the right to jury trial of legal issues can never (except in undefined, and prob-
ably non-existent circumstances) be lost through prior determination of equitable lssuen.
359 U.S. 500, 511 (1959).
17. Citations and footnote omitted. 323 F.2d at 836.
18. Ibid.
19. The court used the same historical analysis to determine the question of jury right
in a corporate action based upon breach of fiduciary duty by officers. Since the jury had
expressly found the defendants innocent of fraud, the Ninth Circuit concluded that the
finding of breach of fiduciary duty actually rested upon a finding of gross negligence.
Then it held that when a breach of fiduciary duty rests on underlying negligence, the
question of breach is historically a jury question. 323 F.2d at 837.
20. Id. at 836-37.
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treated a derivative suit as a combination of separable legal and equitable
causes of action for purposes of analysis of the right to jury trial.
The implicit basis of DePinto - that a derivative action should be treated
as a combination rather than a unitary action - appears to rest on a mistaken
treatment of a conceptual doctrine of current corporate law as an historical
fact. At the root of traditional corporate law is the theory of "the corporate
entity" or the "concept of separate personality." In its simplest terms, this is
an expression of the idea that at common law the corporation was considered
an entity distinct and separate from its shareholders.2 1 The fundamental reason
for such a notion was to provide an analytic basis to justify the freedom of
shareholders from unlimited liability for corporate liabilities.-22 A seemingly
logical result of these doctrines was the complementary notion that harm to
the corporation did not confer any right of action upon a shareholder.2 How-
ever, the potential for managerial abuse resulting from the refusal of the
courts of common law to recognize shareholder rights of action led the courts
of equity to assume jurisdiction over suits brought by stockholders to enforce
a right of action running to the "separate personality" of the corporation."
This historical development explains the "derivative" nature of shareholder
actions; they are conceptualized as suits in which a shareholder merely sets
in motion the adjudication of a cause of action belonging to the corporation.
Professor Ballantine is typical of the corporate theorists who view derivative
actions as including two distinct aspects: "(1) to enforce in equity the corpo-
rate duty to the shareholder and (2) to enforce in the same proceedings the
basic or underlying corporate right of action."2 5 Thus, he refers to a share-
holder suit as being "in effect a combination of two causes of action, a pro-
ceeding having a dual nature."26
Despite this analytic duality, statements of conceptual theory locate juris-
diction over derivative actions exclusively in equity in order to reconcile the
historical existence of these suits with the concept of the separate corporate
21. See LATT, CoaPoRATiNs c. 2, § 1 (1959) [hereinafter cited as LA'rrnm ; 2
HoaRsTr=n, CORPORAT ON LAw "w PRAIcnE § 711 (1959) [hereinafter cited as Ho;-
sT=]; STEvENs, CORpoRATIONS § 10 (2d ed. 1949) [hereinafter cited as STEzs].
22. See, e.g., In re John Koke Co., 38 F.2d 232 (9th Cir. 1930), cert. denicd, 282 U.S.
840 (1930).
23. "At law" the corporation is regarded as a unit; and "at law" therefore individual
shareholders may not sue although damage to the corporation necessarily has re-
duced the value of the interest of each shareholder. The complaint of a shareholder
is maintainable in equity, where it has been recognized almost since the beginnings
of the business corporation.
2 Homsr § 711 at 191.
24. Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 547-48 (1949); Prunty,
The Shareholders' Derivative Suit: Notes on Its Derivation, 32 N.Y.U.L. Rv. 980 (1957).
25. BAzsNiNi, CoRpoRATIo Ns § 151, at 359 (rev. ed. 1946).
26. Id. § 145 at 343. FLcrcHER, LATri, and BALLANTiNE, LATrIN AND JENI NGS are
in rhetorical as well as theoretical agreement. FrErcHER § 5941; LATTIN ch. 8, § 2; BAL-
LANTNqE LATTIN & JENNIGS, CASES AND MAT ALS ON CORMoRATIoNs 521 (2d ed.
1953). Stevens also subscribes to the dual analysis of derivative actions. STEmNs § 170.
19651
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entity.27 Moreover, while the traditional analysis of derivative actions sets
up a conceptual distinction between the right of the shareholder and the right
of the corporation, the postulated "corporate cause of action" has never been
thought to describe an actual historical class of suit which was recognized
by courts of law. Instead, all commentators have recognized that historically
equity has had exclusive jurisdiction over derivative suits and that the share-
holder's right to set in motion the adjudication of a "corporate cause of action"
has controlled the characterization of the entire action. Thus, it is generally
agreed that there is no right to trial by jury in derivative suits.2 8
An additional basis for regarding the historical counterpart of the modern
derivative suit as a unitary action, equitable in nature, is found in the examina-
tion of the early English cases which established the shareholder's right to
petition a court of equity. These cases did not follow the conceptual separation
of individual and corporate rights, nor the notion that a plaintiff in a derivative
action vicariously asserts the right of the corporation. Instead, the decisions
acknowledged that harm to the corporation necessarily reduced the interest
of a complaining shareholder and recognized a direct trust relationship between
corporate officers and shareholders, thereby providing a traditional foundation
27. 2 HoRNsTmN § 711. The conceptual foundation for equitable jurisdiction over
derivative actions has been similarly stated in Glenn, The Stockholders' Suil - Corporate
and Individual Grievances, 33 YAuE L.J. 580, 582 (1924). See also commentators cited
note 26 supra.
28. Lattin, who follows the dual aspect conceptual analysis of derivative actions, see
note 26 supra, acknowledges the general characterization of the suit as equitable:
A derivative action is an invention of courts of equity and may be brought only
in equity whether the corporate cause of action be in law or not. As far as corporate
rights and defenses available against it are in issue, these issues are decided exactly
as if the corporation were the plaintiff except the matter of jury trial, for the case
being in equity there is no right to jury trial.
LArvN~ ch. 8, § 3.
Hornstein identifies the nature of the action as equitable and simply notes that "the
judge, without a jury, tries the case on the merits." 2 HORNSTEmI § 730.
Fletcher says: "An action by individual stockholders making the corporation a party
defendant is equitable in nature, and plaintiffs are not entitled to a jury trial as a matter
of right." 13 FlE=CHER § 5931. In a later passage Fletcher discusses the problem raised by
DePinto:
The stockholders' suit is always one in equity, at least unless otherwise provided
by statute. But the fact that the stockholder gets into the litigation through a bill
in equity does not change the fact that the right to be enforced is the legal right of
the corporation. A stockholder cannot sue, as a representative of the corporation, by
bringing an action at law, notwithstanding the corporation could have recovered In
an action at law. Even where the only relief allowable is a recovery of damages the
suit is nevertheless one in equity and not an action at law.
13 Fzm-rcHma § 5944.
Pomeroy locates derivative actions as a branch of equity jurisdictions over quasi-trus-
tees; equity recognizes that shareholders are ultimately the only beneficiaries. 4 PoMumoY,
EQurrY JURiSPRUDENcE § 1095 (5th ed. 1941).
Moore identifies the nature of derivative actions as equitable and therefore finds no
right to trial by jury. 5 Mooan 38.38[4].
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for exclusive equity jurisdiction.29 Similarly, early American cases labelled
the relationship between corporate officers and shareholders as one of trust, 0
Thus, a shareholder could sue his "trustee" directly to enforce his equitable
rights as beneficiary, even though the corporation itself retained a separate
and concurrent right of action.3 '
The trust theory, however, was unable to reach cases in which a shareholder
sued to enforce a corporate right against an outsiderm Since such cases could
29. Prunty, supra note 24, at 980-85. Another basis of equity jurisdiction in the early
English cases was the representative nature of the suit. Common law rules of joinder were
initially inflexible and the class suit therefore became a branch of equity jurisdiction. Ibid.
See generally 3 MooRE f 23.02, 5 MooRE f 38.38[2].
30. The American case most frequently cited as the first shareholder's derivative
action is Robinson v. Smith, 3 Paige Ch.R. 222 (N.Y. 1832). But the decision in this case
appears to rest on an earlier dictum by Chancellor Kent in Attorney-General v. Utica Ins.
Co., 2 Johns. Ch.R. 371 (N.Y. 1817). The holding in this earlier case actually involved a
limitation on the power of equity - that equity lacked power to enjoin a corporation for
violation of its franchise. But Chancellor Kent went on to help establish a power of equity
in a dictum quoted in support of the holding in the Robinson decision:
[T]he persons who, from time to time, exercise the corporate powers may, in their
character of trustees, be accountable to this Court for a fraudulent breach of trust;
and to this plain and ordinary head of equity, the jurisdiction of this Court over
corporations ought to be confined.
Attorney-General v. Utica Ins. Co., supra at 389.
The Robinson decision applied Kent's dictum in its holding:
The directors are the trustees or managing partners, and the stockholders are the
cestui que trusts, and have a joint interest in all the property and effects of the
corporation. And no injury to the stockholders may sustain by a fraudulent breach
of trust can, upon the general principles of equity, be suffered to pass without a
remedy.
Robinson v. Smith, supra at 232.
See also Taylor v. The Miami Exporting Co., 5 Ohio 162 (1831): "We think this
Court, in a proper case made, has the power to compel an account from bank directors to
their stockholders... and to set aside their fraudulent acts, if injurious to their prin-
cipals." Id. at 168. Professor Prunty regards this case as "the first application, pro-share-
holder, of the fiduciary principle to the facts of a typical derivative action." Prunty, stupra
note 24, at 988. See also 4 Posxunoy § 1095.
31. The fact that in this and other formative derivative actions the corporation was
required as a necessary party does not indicate that shareholders' rights were regarded as
secondary. The stated reason in the early cases was to prevent double recovery, suggest-
ing a conception of the shareholder's action as "parallel rather than tangential to the
corporate right." The corporate role in these early suits was simply that of the passive
recipient. Prunty, supra note 24, at 988-89.
32. According to Professor Prunty, the first of these cases was Forbes v. Whitlock,
3 Ed. Ch. 446 (N.Y. 1841). Prunty, supra note 24, at 990. This was a suit by stockholders
for breach of contract between a third party and the corporation. The court refused to
stretch the trust relation to cover this situation, stating that shareholders "have not
such an interest now as entitles them to ... prosecute on their individual account," and
fearing that such a right "would be attended with endless difficulty and embarrassment."
Forbes v. Whitlock, supra at 447-48. But the court limited the extent of the holding by
noting that the shareholders have a direct right "when the directors, officers or managers,
having the control of the corporation and its affairs, are guilty of misconduct, that
amount[s] to a breach of duty as trustees." Ibid.
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not rest upon the equitable right of the shareholder to call his trustee (the
corporate officer) to account, 3 the courts denied shareholders direct rights
against the defendant. Instead, the shareholder was required to assert deriva-
tive, or secondary, rights against the outsider in the name of the corporation. 5
These cases originated the dual analysis stressed by current theories of deriva-
tive actions. Over a period of time the beneficiary-trustee doctrine was dis-
carded in favor of a framework which places all shareholder suits in a single
derivative category, regardless of whether the defendant is an officer, director
or outsider. But despite this shift in analysis, equity maintained exclusive juris-
diction over all derivative suits.
Finally, the decisions of state and federal courts are in conflict with the
holding of DePinto. In states where trial by jury is guaranteed by a constitu-
tional provision similar to the seventh amendment, the majority of cases con-
clude that derivative actions are equitable in nature and therefore hold that
there is no right to jury trial.3 Likewise, virtually every federal decision prior
to DePinto conforms to the theory of origin of stockholder's suits advanced by
the Supreme Court in Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp.:
Equity came to the relief of the stockholder, who had no standing to
bring civil action at law against faithless directors and managers. Equity,
however, allowed him to step into the corporation's shoes and to seek in
its right the restitution he could not demand in his own. 0
The consequence of this historical interpretation which places derivative suits
within equity's jurisdiction was that, until DePinto, the guaranty of the
seventh amendment had been held inapplicable to these actions. A characteristic
33. It appears that the right of a beneficiary to sue a third party when the trustee had
a right of action but refused to sue was not yet mature. 3 Scow ox TRusTs § 282.1 (2d
ed. 1956).
34. The confusion of the cases which established the right of the shareholder to ste
to enforce a corporate right against an outsider is illustrated by the extensive opinion of
the Supreme Court in Dodge v. Woolsey, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 331 (1855). In order to
establish this right, it was necessary to integrate the breach of trust notion of the Robin-
son case with the theory of the lack of interest of shareholders in corporate rights against
third parties of the Forbes case. The result was the secondary or derivative right of the
shareholder to enforce the adjudication of a right of action in the corporation, Dodge
v. Woolsey, supra at 343-44.
35. E.g., Goetz v. Manufacturers' & Traders' Trust Co., 154 Misc. 733, 277 N.Y. Supp.
802 (Sup. Ct. 1935) ; Metcalf v. Shamel, 166 Cal. App. 2d 789, 333 P.2d 857 (1959) ; Mfor-
ton v. Morton Realty Co., 41 Idaho 729, 241 Pac. 1014 (1925) ; Neff v. Barber, 162 NX.W
667 (Sup. Ct. Wis. 1917); Steinway v. Griffith Consol. Theatres, 273 P.2d 872 (Sup. CLt
Okla. 1954).
36. 337 U.S. 541, 548 (1949). Cf. Koster v. Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 330 U.S. 518,
522 (1947); Meyer v. Fleming, 327 U.S. 161, 167 (1946); Hawes v. Oakland, 104 U.S.
450 (1881); Dodge v. Woolsey, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 331, 341-44 (1855).
The equitable nature of derivative actions was reflected in the adoption of Equity Rule
94 in 1882, and Rule 27 of the Equity Rules of 1912 as regulations for derivative actions,
Rule 23(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is the modem counterpart of these
Equity Rules. 3 MooRE 23.15[l].
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expression appears in Liken v. Sffer, a case frequently cited for its discussion
of the nature of the derivative suit:
A stockholder's derivative suit is an invention of the courts of equity
and is recognizable only in equity and cannot be maintained at law ...
Even if the claim, if sued directly by the corporation, would be an action
at law, yet, if enforced by means of a stockholder's derivative suit, it is
prosecuted by an action in equity.37
Against this background of doctrine, history and precedent, it is not easy
to understand the basis of the DePinto holding that the seventh amendment
establishes a right to jury trial in any derivative action involving claims which,
if brought directly by the corporation, would be considered legal in nature.-s
37. 64 F. Supp. 432, 441 (N.D. Iowa 1946).
38. One group of cases which presents an apparent deviation from the majority of
cases involving the problem of jury trial in derivative actions is that in which shareholders
sue derivatively to enforce a corporate right of action for treble damages under the anti-
trust laws. The possibility of abuse is apparent if derivative actions, rather than corporate
actions, were instituted to prevent a defendant's right to jury trial. Mr. Justice Holmes
posed the troublesome question in Fleitnann v. Welsbach St. Lighting Co.:
Of course the claim set up is that of the corporation alone, and if the corporation
were proceeding directly under the statute no one can doubt that its only remedy
would be at law. Therefore the inquiry at once arises why the defendants' right to
a jury trial should be taken away because the present plaintiff cannot persuade the
only party having a cause of action to sue ....
240 U.S. 27, 28 (1916). Holmes' answer was that "when a penalty of triple damages is
sought to be inflicted, the statute should not be read as attempting to authorize liability
to be enforced otherwise than through the verdict of a jury in a court of common law."
Id. at 29. Thus, the holding was that a derivative action, as an action in equity in which
there was no right of jury trial, could not be brought to enforce a corporate right to
treble damages under the Sherman Act.
Later cases retreated from the rigid position of Fleitinann, and in 1953 the Second
Circuit held in Fanchon & Marco, Inc. v. Paramount Pictures, 202 F.2d 731 (2d Cir.
1953), that a derivative action based on a violation of the antitrust laws could be brought
if the plaintiff presented a claim for equitable relief or simple damages. Although this was
the extent of the holding, and the case was remanded to the district court for consideration
of the plaintiff's claim for relief, Judge Clark was troubled by the problem of right to jury
trial when the demand for judgment for treble damages arose under the Clayton Act. He
prophesied: "the question of jury trial may never arise... Generally speaking it is w,.ise
not to borrow trouble as to questions which may remain dormant." 202 F.2d at 735. Not
content, apparently, with his own advice, Judge Clark tried to reconcile the precedents. On
one hand, he noted that stockholders' derivative actions were inventions of equity to
redress breaches of fiduciary duty by corporate managers. On the other hand, he recog-
nized that "[tihe Fleitmann case does hold specifically that a party is entitled to a verdict
of the jury against him before he can be forced to pay treble damages under 15 U.S.C.A.
§ 15." 202 F.2d at 735. His conclusion was that:
The two major issues of right of the shareholder to sue and of violation of antitrust
laws causing damage to the corporation can be tried side by side or otherwise ...
that one may go to a jury while the other does not causes no difficulty.
202 F2d at 735.
Judge Clark's dictum thus anticipates the analytic approach of DePinto: that a deriva-
tive action may involve separable issues for purposes of determining the right to jury trial.
But the separation rests upon the specific statutory construction of Fleitinann rather than
1965]
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Language in the opinion, however, indicates that the Ninth Circuit relied for
its holding upon two recent Supreme Court decisions which have expanded
the coverage of the seventh amendment guaranty.
In the more significant of these decisions, Beacon Theatres v. Wcstovr,39
the plaintiff sought an injunction preventing defendant from instituting an
antitrust action and a declaratory judgment that certain movie distribution
contracts were not in violation of the antitrust laws. The defendant filed an
answer and a counterclaim seeking treble damages against the plaintiff, and
demanded a jury trial on the factual issues relating to the question of the
violation of the antitrust laws. The trial court viewed the issues raised by the
complaint as essentially equitable. It therefore directed that the common issue
of both the complaint and the counterclaim - the lawfulness of the distribution
contracts - be tried to the court. The Ninth Circuit upheld the trial judge's
order, and held that the jury question must be answered by reading the com-
plaint as a whole. Since the complaint asked for injunctive relief as well as
for declaratory judgnment, and since injunctive relief traditionally has been
cognizable in equity, the court agreed with the district court tflat the com-
plaint should be read as predominantly equitable.40 Assuming the plaintiff had
properly invoked equity jurisdiction, the case fits the historical pattern of cases
in which A has grounds for and seeks equitable relief before B institutes an
action at law and B interposes a legal counterclaim. The rule in such cases
had been that, while the legal claim was triable to a jury, the trial judge had
discretion in determining trial sequence and could hear the equitable claim
first, thus estopping relitigation on all facts common to both claims. 41
The Supreme Court refused to apply this traditional rule in Beacon Theatres.
The Court could have held that the plaintiff was simply trying to circumvent
defendant's right to jury trial, that the claim was not cognizable in equity,
and that, therefore, the trial judge's order was an abuse of discretion.42 But
upon the historical test of the seventh amendment. As Judge Clark had earlier pointed out,
a derivative action based on a violation of the antitrust law, clearly a legal action if brought
directly by the corporation, would have been cognizable by a court of equity if the plain-
tiff's demand for judgment had been either for equitable relief or simple damages, Tiun,,
Judge Clark's dictum in Fanchon & Marco which suggests a fragmented view of deriva-
tive suits is not strictly relevant to the problem of jury trial in DePintlo, as no federal
statute has been construed to guarantee a jury trial in a derivative action for simple
damages on the negligence of corporate officers.
39. 359 U.S. 500 (1959).
40. Beacon Theatres v. Westover, 252 F2d 864 (9th Cir. 1958).
41. American Life Ins. Co. v. Stewart, 300 U.S. 203 (1937); James, Right to a Jury
Trial in Civil Actions, 72 YALE L.J. 655, 683 (1963). The framers of the declaratory judg-
ment acts, like the authors of the Federal Rules, sought merely to preserve existing jury
rights without expansion or diminution. BORCHARD, DECLARATORY JUDGMENT 399-404 (2d
ed. 1941). Thus courts had followed the historical pattern: where declaratory relief did
not fit into a traditional pattern of equitable relief, but was rather "an inverted lawsuit,"
parties had a right to jury trial. But if the declaratory action was a counterpart of a suit
in equity there was no jury right.
42. The majority acknowledged the rule of American Life Ins. Co. v. Stewart, 300
U.S. 203 (1937), that an equity court could have discretion to enjoin a lawsuit to provide
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the Court expressly assumed the trial court's premise that the complaint pre-
sented adequate grounds for equitable relief 43 - traditionally the cue for the
chancellor's discretion as to sequence of trial - and held that because the
counterclaim presented a cause of action cognizable at law the parties had
a right to jury trial on any factual issues common to the prayer for equitable
relief and the legal counterclaim. The broad statement of the decision vas
that "only under the most imperative circumstances, circumstances which in
view of the flexible procedure of the Federal Rules we cannot now anticipate,
can the right to jury trial of legal issues be lost through prior determination
of equitable claims."44
The sweeping nature of this language has been underscored by the Supreme
Court in Dairy Queen v. Wood,45 the second recent decision concerning the
right to jury trial in civil actions. In Dairy Queen, as in Bcacon Theatres, the
result is not surprising when read against the particular facts of the case. The
plaintiff had attempted to create equitable jurisdiction by asking for injunctive
relief and an accounting, although his claim for relief was essentially for dam-
ages resulting from a breach of contract. The Court held that "the constitu-
tional right to trial by jury cannot be made to depend upon the choice of words
used in the pleading."46 But much of the Court's language in Dairy Queen,
like that in Beacon Theatres, is broader than the facts of the case warrant.
The trial judge had struck the demand for trial by jury upon the ground that
full determination of a case in one court. But a trial judge's order of trial sequence which
denied jury trial of a legal counterclaim through collateral estoppel could be reversed on
the ground of an abuse of discretion. Beacon Theatres v. Wood, stpra note 39, at 505.
43. . . . assuming additionally that the complaint can be read as alleging the kind of
harassment by a multiplicity of lawsuits which would traditionally have justified
equity to take jurisdiction and settle the case in one suit, we are nevertheless of the
opinion that, under the Declaratory Judgment Act and the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, neither claim can justify denying Beacon a trial by jury of all the issues
in the antitrust controversy.
Id. at 506.
44. Id. at 510, 511.
The effect of Beacon Theatres has been to limit if not eliminate, any use of discretion
which removes a "legal issue" from jury trial. At least one Circuit has realized the sweep-
ing implication of the decision. The Fifth Circuit recently stated:
It is therefore immaterial that the case at bar contains a stronger basis for equitable
relief than was present in Beacon Theatres. It would make no difference if the
equitable cause clearly out-weighed the legal cause so that the basic issue of the case
taken as a whole is equitable. As long as any legal cause is involved the jury right
it creates controls. This is the teaching of Beacon Theatres as we construe it.
Thermo-stitch, Inc. v. Chemi-Cord Processing Corp., 294 F.2d 486, 491 (5th Cir. 1961).
This case presented a question similar to that decided in Beacon Theatres. Plaintift sued
for a declaratory judgment that defendant's patents were invalid and had not been in-
fringed. Defendant counterclaimed for patent infringement fraud and antitrust violations
and demanded a jury trial upon the factual issues of the counterclaim. The Fifth Circuit
held that the trial judge was required by Beacon Theatres to submit these issues to a jury.
45. 369 U.S. 469 (1962).
46. Id. at 477-78.
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any legal issues in the case were "incidental" to the equitable issues. In re-
sponse, the Supreme Court held that Beacon Theatres meant that the right to
jury trial of legal issues could not be lost even where the legal issues could
properly be characterized as incidental to equitable issues. 47 It is not clear
how far this language in clarification of Beacon Theatres extends the Court's
holding in Dairy Queen that the right to jury trial cannot depend upon "the
choice of words used in the pleading." The language may mean that whenever
a traditionally equitable claim involves even an incidental legal issue there
must be a right to jury trial of that legal issue. This reading would eradicate
a major portion of equity jurisdiction for purposes of determining the right
to jury trial, since legal issues will necessarily be involved in all cases in
which equity has concurrent jurisdiction with law - the class of cases which
equity hears because of the inadequacy of legal remedies.
However, the apparent rationale of decision in Beacon Theatres and Dairy
Queen suggests that the opinions must be interpreted to reflect the fact that
both suits were combinations of historically separable legal and equitable claims,
Beacon Theatres and Dairy Queen fall within the historical pattern of cases
in which equity would grant a remedy and then retain jurisdiction over the
remainder of the suit despite the availability of legal remedies. These legal
remedies were considered inadequate and therefore a basis for concurrent juris-
diction because of difficulties inherent in the separation of law and equity,
which, it was thought, would cause the plaintiff irreparable injury if the case
were dismissed. 4s The Supreme Court in Beacon Theatres focused its inquiry
upon the justification for this branch of concurrent jurisdiction under the
merged procedure of the Federal Rules.
Inadequacy of remedy and irreparable harm are practical terms, however.
As such their existence today must be determined, not by precedents
decided under discarded procedures, but in the light of the remedies now
made available by the Declaratory Judgment Act and the Federal Rules. 4q 0
Beacon Theatres concluded that the merger of law and equity eliminated this
instance of inadequacy of legal remedy by removing all possible barriers to
the prosecution of the legal claim and thereby undercut equity's jurisdictional
basis.50 Thus Beacon Theatres and Dairy Queen did not resolve the question
47. Id. at 473.
48. E.g., Keith v. Henklemen, 173 Ill. 137, 50 N.E. 692 (1898). See James, siupra note
41, at 670.
49. Beacon Theatres v. Westover, supra note 39, at 507.
50. Since in the federal courts equity has always acted only when legal remedies were
inadequate, the expansion of adequate legal remedies provided by the Declaratory
Judgment Act and the Federal Rules necessarily affects the scope of equity. This,
the justification for equity's deciding legal issues once it obtains jurisdiction, and
refusing to dismiss a case, merely because subsequently a legal remedy becomen
available, must be re-evaluated in the light of the liberal joinder provisions of the
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of jury trial under the seventh amendment by applying the traditional historical
test. Instead these cases projected fundamental changes in modem conditions
into the historical context to which the seventh amendment refers and hypothe-
sized the division between law and equity jurisdiction which would have ob-
tained had the modem procedures existed at that time.
This analysis of Beacon Theatres indicates that the Ninth Circuit -was in
error in relying upon the case for its holding in DePinto. Bcacon Theatres is
applicable to modem civil actions which involve a combination of historically
separable suits in law and equity, whether the combination is a result of the
merger of law and equity or is the descendant of a situation in which equity
would have retained jurisdiction of a legal claim after the adjudication of a
claim for equitable relief.5 ' Thus, for purposes of applying the Beacon The-
atres rule, it is essential to stress the difference between the modern action
whose issues individually reflect historically separable causes of action and the
modem action which derives from a unitary cause of action. Stockholders'
derivative actions are not, of course, a product of the merger of law and
equity. Nor are they historically a combination of separable equitable and
legal causes of action. Beacon Theatres and Dairy Queen have not empowered
federal courts to ignore the historical division of law and equity in applying
the guaranty of the seventh amendment. Since the DePinto court did not
purport to rest its decision upon changes in modem procedures affecting
the characterization of stockholders' derivative suits as equitable in nature,
the application of the Beacon Theatres doctrine to derivative actions is an
unwarranted extension of the seventh amendment.5 2
51. See Thermo-stitch, Inc. v. Chemi-Cord Processing Corp., 294 F.2d 486 at 491
(5th Cir. 1961), quoted at note 44 upra.
52. It may be objected that the analysis of this Note focuses solely upon an histoical
analysis of questionable relevance in a merged procedure. Because of the deficiencies of
the historical test in providing a rational ordering of jury and court cases, see note 13
supra, it might be argued that a decline of historical rigidity accompanied by a functional
awareness of the needs of modem judicial administration would be welcome. One obvious
advantage of a flexible construction of the seventh amendment is the consideration which
could thereby be afforded to nonconstitutional arguments for and against the right to jury
trial in different types of litigation. However, there would be two objections to an attempt
to justify the holding in DePinto on this basis. First, it is impossible to reach satisfactory
conclusions from a functional analysis of the desirability of jury trial in civil actions
generally or particularly in derivative litigation. There are few current debates in the law
in which the arguments seem less susceptible of proof and more dependent upon intuitive
judgments. For exaiple, the argument that the jury is not a sufficiently efficient and dis-
criminating trier of fact to effectively investigate complex derivative suits can be countered
with the argument that application of common sense notions of fairness are entirely appro-
priate to the recurring questions of what constitutes a breach of fiduciary duty. A more
basic objection concerns the legitimacy of functional analysis in a case involving the appli-
cation of the seventh amendment. The amendment is strictly limited by its language to a
preservation of the right to jury trial at common law. It represents a political compromise
based upon the absence of consensus as to the proper functions of the jury. Since no con-
sensus has developed since the adoption of the amendment it seems improper for courts
to abandon the compromise.
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